diff --git a/docs/security/accepted-risks.md b/docs/security/accepted-risks.md
index 95e2644..d4be2fc 100644
--- a/docs/security/accepted-risks.md
+++ b/docs/security/accepted-risks.md
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ revisit (trigger).
 |---|---|---|---|
 | R1 | **Active supply-chain scanning deferred** — baseline hygiene *is* required (tiered image pinning per ADR-011 — stateful `tag@digest`, stateless rolling — prefer official/verified images; gitleaks), but images and dependencies are not actively vulnerability-scanned (Trivy/Grype) or signature-verified | Scanning only pays off with the capacity to triage its output; the realistic threat is opportunistic, not a targeted supply-chain attack | A monitoring/triage stack is live; hosting high-value data/finances for others; a relevant upstream compromise |
 | R2 | **SELinux not used** — no SELinux mandatory access control | AppArmor — Debian-native and enforced via the CIS baseline — already provides MAC; adding SELinux means two MAC systems, non-native to Debian, for no real gain | A service that ships and requires its own SELinux policy; threat model shifts toward targeted attackers |
-| R3 | **Mesh-VPN coordinator dependency (pending VPN choice)** — remote SSH to the control node `ubongo` (ADR-015) rides a mesh VPN whose coordination plane may be a third party (e.g. hosted Tailscale/NetBird) | A hosted coordinator keeps the mesh up when the cluster is down, which *helps* recovery; nothing is exposed to the public internet (ADR-002 preserved). Provisional — finalised when the VPN is chosen (separate discussion) | The VPN choice is settled (replace this entry with the concrete decision); a self-hosted coordinator is adopted; the provider's trust/security posture changes |
+| R3 | **Self-hosted mesh control plane is a public target on `askari`** — the NetBird coordinator (ADR-016) exposes a management API + dashboard (TCP 80/443) and Coturn (UDP 3478) on `askari`'s public IP; the management API controls the whole mesh | Self-hosting means **no third-party trust** and an off-site control plane that survives a homelab outage (boma's sovereignty ethos). Residual surface is on `askari` (already a public VPS) and is mitigated: TLS + embedded-IdP login, source-IP restriction where practical, `base` hardening, version-pinned NetBird (ADR-011) patched on boma's cadence | A coordinator compromise or unpatched NetBird CVE; the management plane is reachable without auth/IP-limits; the operational burden makes a hosted coordinator worth reconsidering |
 
 _Last reviewed: 2026-06-05. The prior gaps (full CIS hardening, SELinux/AppArmor,
 IDS) were re-challenged and **adopted rather than accepted**: CIS Debian L1+L2 + CIS