test(integration): add the 'be ubongo' profile (input-only default-deny)

A control-group VM that applies base with INPUT-only default-deny (forward
policy accept; admin-addr SSH allow). verify.yml is now profile-aware via an
integration_profile marker — the askari Docker/DNAT block is gated, and a ubongo
block asserts input drop + forward accept + the admin-addr rule. Enables
`make test-integration HOST=ubongo`. Mesh-hardening 2/3 (ADR-025).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

tests/integration/overrides/askari.yml

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 ---
 # Integration-test overlay for the "askari" profile (ADR-025). Passed via `-e @`.
 # Reproduces the 2026-06-17 incident: apply base's nftables default-deny to a Docker host.
+integration_profile: askari
 base__firewall_apply: true
 # Keep a break-glass: sshd stays on all interfaces (never wt0-only in a throwaway VM).
 base__ssh_listen_mesh_only: false

tests/integration/overrides/ubongo.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+---
+# Integration-test overlay for the "ubongo" profile (ADR-025). Passed via `-e @`.
+# Exercises mesh-hardening 2/3: base's INPUT-only default-deny on the control node — input
+# chain default-deny, forward chain left permissive (Docker/libvirt-NAT safe), no sshd
+# ListenAddress change (so no boot-race).
+integration_profile: ubongo
+base__firewall_apply: true
+base__firewall_input_only: true        # forward chain renders `policy accept`
+base__firewall_admin_addrs:
+  - "192.168.150.98"                   # two representative LAN sources — exercises the
+  - "192.168.150.99"                   # admin-addr loop with a multi-entry list (like ubongo)
+# Never wt0-only; never touch the real mesh from a throwaway VM.
+base__ssh_listen_mesh_only: false
+base__mesh_enabled: false
+# Allow SSH from the libvirt-NAT gateway (where the driver/ansible connect from) so the
+# default-deny apply + the reboot don't lock out the harness. By source IP (interface-
+# independent). This is the harness's lifeline; the admin-addr above is only exercised.
+base__firewall_control_addr: "192.168.150.1"

tests/integration/profiles/ubongo.json

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+{
+  "groups": ["control"],
+  "applies": [
+    {"playbook": "site.yml", "tags": ["base"]}
+  ],
+  "extra_vars_files": ["overrides/ubongo.yml"],
+  "mem_mib": 2048,
+  "vcpus": 2
+}

tests/integration/verify.yml

@@ -1,33 +1,48 @@
 ---
-# Integration verify (ADR-025). Outcome-based: proves Docker forwarding survives the
-# reboot. The load-bearing check probes the VM's published :80 FROM the controller
-# (ubongo) — if base's forward-drop killed DNAT, this times out (the FRICTION #1 bug).
+# Integration verify (ADR-025). Outcome-based, profile-aware: the active profile is named by
+# `integration_profile` (set in each profile's overlay). Each profile asserts its own success
+# criteria; an unknown/unset profile fails loudly (never a silent pass).
 - name: Verify the rebooted host
   hosts: all
   become: true
   gather_facts: false
   tasks:
-    - name: Gather service facts
+    - name: A known integration_profile must be set (no silent pass)
+      ansible.builtin.assert:
+        that:
+          - integration_profile is defined
+          - integration_profile in ['askari', 'ubongo']
+        fail_msg: "integration_profile must be set in the profile overlay (askari|ubongo)"
+
+    # ── askari profile — Docker host: published-port forwarding survives the reboot ──
+    # The load-bearing check probes the VM's published :80 FROM the controller (ubongo) — if
+    # base's forward-drop killed DNAT, this times out (the FRICTION 2026-06-17 #1 bug).
+    - name: (askari) Gather service facts
+      when: integration_profile == 'askari'
       ansible.builtin.service_facts:
 
-    - name: Docker daemon is active
+    - name: (askari) Docker daemon is active
+      when: integration_profile == 'askari'
       ansible.builtin.assert:
         that: "ansible_facts.services['docker.service'].state == 'running'"
         fail_msg: "docker.service is not running"
 
-    - name: Forward chain permits container traffic (drop-in loaded)
+    - name: (askari) Forward chain permits container traffic (drop-in loaded)
+      when: integration_profile == 'askari'
       ansible.builtin.command: nft list chain inet filter forward
       register: _fwd
       changed_when: false
 
-    - name: Assert container forwarding is allowed (not pure drop)
+    - name: (askari) Assert container forwarding is allowed (not pure drop)
+      when: integration_profile == 'askari'
       ansible.builtin.assert:
         that: "'accept' in _fwd.stdout"
         fail_msg: >-
           forward chain is pure drop — container forwarding will die on reboot
           (FRICTION 2026-06-17 #1). docker_host container-forward drop-in missing.
 
-    - name: Published port answers from the controller (DNAT + forward alive)
+    - name: (askari) Published port answers from the controller (DNAT + forward alive)
+      when: integration_profile == 'askari'
       delegate_to: localhost
       become: false
       ansible.builtin.uri:
@@ -42,3 +57,27 @@
       retries: 5
       delay: 6
       until: _probe is succeeded
+
+    # ── ubongo profile — control node: INPUT-only default-deny survives the reboot ──
+    # SSH reachability across the reboot is proven by the harness itself (it re-SSHes and
+    # checks boot_id changed before this verify runs). Here we assert the ruleset shape.
+    - name: (ubongo) Read the live nftables ruleset
+      when: integration_profile == 'ubongo'
+      ansible.builtin.command: nft list ruleset
+      register: _nft
+      changed_when: false
+
+    - name: (ubongo) INPUT default-deny, forward permissive, lifeline + admin-addr allow
+      when: integration_profile == 'ubongo'
+      ansible.builtin.assert:
+        that:
+          - "'hook input priority 0; policy drop;' in _nft.stdout"
+          - "'hook forward priority 0; policy accept;' in _nft.stdout"
+          # the ssh-from-control lifeline (base__firewall_control_addr) — the reconnect path
+          - "'ip saddr 192.168.150.1 tcp dport 22 accept' in _nft.stdout"
+          - "'ip saddr 192.168.150.98 tcp dport 22 accept' in _nft.stdout"
+          - "'ip saddr 192.168.150.99 tcp dport 22 accept' in _nft.stdout"
+        fail_msg: >-
+          ubongo profile: expected input policy drop, forward policy accept (input-only),
+          the ssh-from-control lifeline (192.168.150.1), and both admin-addr
+          (192.168.150.98/99) SSH allows in the live ruleset.