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feat(inventory): askari INPUT-only firewall + WAN break-glass + manage over wt0

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Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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sjat 2026-06-19 17:18:58 +02:00
parent ab328a2f79
commit d9b8676fce
2 changed files with 24 additions and 13 deletions
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30
inventories/production/group_vars/offsite_hosts/vars.yml
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--- ---
# Off-site hosts (askari). askari runs the NetBird coordinator AND is a mesh peer # Off-site hosts (askari). askari runs the NetBird coordinator AND is a mesh peer
# (ADR-016, M5). base__mesh_enabled stays true (M5 enrollment). # (ADR-016, M5).
# #
# Mesh-hardening 1/3 (move SSH onto wt0 + nftables default-deny) was attempted on # Mesh-hardening REDESIGN (2026-06-19): the 2026-06-17 attempt was backed out (forward
# 2026-06-17 and BACKED OUT after it took askari down: applying base's nftables # `policy drop` broke Docker on reboot; wt0-only sshd left no break-glass; ip_nonlocal_bind
# `forward policy drop` to a Docker host broke container forwarding/NAT on reboot, and the # did not beat the boot-race). The redesign mirrors the proven ubongo 2/3 pattern:
# wt0-only sshd ListenAddress left no break-glass (ip_nonlocal_bind did not beat the boot # - INPUT-only default-deny (base__firewall_input_only) — forward stays `policy accept`
# race). Until docker_host ships Docker-safe container-forward rules and the boot-race + # so Docker container forwarding/NAT survive a reboot;
# coordinator-bootstrap issues are re-designed, askari keeps: # - SSH scoped by the host firewall (iifname wt0 + admin-addr), NOT a sshd ListenAddress
# - sshd listening on all interfaces (reachable over the WAN; Hetzner Cloud Firewall is # change — base__ssh_listen_mesh_only stays false, so there is no boot-race;
# the perimeter) — base__ssh_listen_mesh_only stays false, # - WAN :22 is DELIBERATELY left open from ubongo's WAN IP (base__firewall_admin_addrs)
# - the host nftables firewall NOT applied — base__firewall_apply false. # as the permanent non-mesh break-glass — the coordinator-host exception (a host's only
# See the incident write-up / the mesh-hardening re-spec before re-enabling either. # management path must never depend on a service that host itself hosts).
# Spec: docs/superpowers/specs/2026-06-19-mesh-hardening-askari-redesign-design.md
base__mesh_enabled: true base__mesh_enabled: true
base__ssh_listen_mesh_only: false base__firewall_apply: true
base__firewall_apply: false base__firewall_input_only: true # forward stays `policy accept` → Docker-safe
base__ssh_listen_mesh_only: false # no sshd ListenAddress change → no boot-race
base__firewall_admin_addrs:
- 91.226.145.80 # ubongo's (static) WAN IP — the permanent non-mesh SSH break-glass

7
inventories/production/host_vars/askari.yml Normal file
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---
# Manage askari over the NetBird mesh (wt0). Overrides the TF-generated WAN `ansible_host`
# in offsite.yml (host_vars are NOT regenerated by tf_to_inventory.py). The WAN :22 path
# (Hetzner Cloud Firewall + base__firewall_admin_addrs = ubongo's WAN) stays as the
# break-glass; the Hetzner web console is the IP-independent ultimate fallback.
# Spec: docs/superpowers/specs/2026-06-19-mesh-hardening-askari-redesign-design.md
ansible_host: 100.99.226.39