diff --git a/docs/superpowers/specs/2026-06-09-operational-access-design.md b/docs/superpowers/specs/2026-06-09-operational-access-design.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..262a96b --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/superpowers/specs/2026-06-09-operational-access-design.md @@ -0,0 +1,214 @@ +# Design — Operational access (ADR-021) + +- **Date:** 2026-06-09 +- **Status:** Approved design — pending implementation plan +- **Implements:** New ADR-021. Resolves TODO 3.2 (API / API access) and TODO 7.2 + (what to set up on hosts, given direct access will be rare). +- **Amends:** ADR-016 (SSH was mesh-only; now also from `ubongo`'s LAN address) and + ADR-020 (adds an `ssh-from-control` symbolic catalog source). +- **Scope:** The operational-access *doctrine* + the declarative `access__*` data model, + the rendered `ACCESS.md` record, and the `/check-access` verifier design. It does **not** + build any of it — `base`/service roles and live hosts don't exist yet. Designed now, + built when there is something to access. + +--- + +## Problem + +boma is built security-first: nftables default-deny, SSH reachable only on the NetBird +`wt0` mesh interface (ADR-016), every service behind the reverse proxy + SSO, no ad-hoc +ports (ADR-002/020). That posture is correct — but it leaves an unanswered operational +question: **when a service or host breaks, how does the operator (and the AI working on +boma's behalf from `ubongo`) actually get in to troubleshoot it?** + +Experience on similar projects shows troubleshooting is far more effective with *several* +documented ways in — SSH, container exec, logs, an admin API — so a single broken path +doesn't mean blind. Today boma has no standard guaranteeing those paths exist, are +documented, or still work. The risk is the classic one: the access you assumed you had is +stale exactly when you need it (key rotated, API disabled, token expired). + +boma already has the right *shape* for the fix. Service roles carry record docs — +`SECURITY.md` (security answers) and `VERIFY.md` (acceptance spec) — gated by the service +checklist and the `new-role` runbook. What's missing is the third sibling: an +**operational access record**, plus the doctrine behind it. + +Two constraints shape the design: + +1. **Minimal attack surface is non-negotiable.** "Multiple ways in" must mean multiple + paths over the *trusted* interface, never new exposed ports. Resolution: all routine + access runs over the mesh from `ubongo`. +2. **A documented path that is never tested drifts.** It fails exactly when needed. So + the structured access facts must be *data* that both renders the doc and drives an + active verifier — the two can then never disagree. + +## Decisions settled in brainstorming + +- **Access is a deployment deliverable.** The deploy that creates a host/service also + records and (by design) proves its access paths. Not rediscovered under pressure. +- **All routine access over the mesh** (`wt0`, from `ubongo`). No new LAN/WAN exposure. +- **Two layers:** a host-level access baseline (resolves TODO 7.2) and a per-service + access record (resolves TODO 3.2). +- **Baseline paths, every service:** host SSH, container exec + compose, logs + (Loki/Grafana, ADR-018), and the service admin API where one exists (`n/a` otherwise). +- **A new first-class sibling record** `ACCESS.md` (next to `SECURITY.md`/`VERIFY.md`), + **rendered from declarative data** — not hand-written prose (the firewall-catalog + philosophy of ADR-020 applied to access). +- **Active verification designed in:** a `/check-access` skill probes the declared paths + and reports which are live — the access analogue of `/verify-service` (ADR-017). +- **Direct LAN SSH from `ubongo` only** is added as a second, mesh-independent path + (amends ADR-016); all other LAN hosts stay blocked by default-deny. + +## The doctrine + +> **Every host and every service guarantees at least one documented, verifiable way in +> for operational troubleshooting — and the deploy that creates it also records and +> proves it.** + +### Two layers + +- **Host layer** (TODO 7.2). Every host, via the `base` role, guarantees a fixed access + baseline: SSH over `wt0` and from `ubongo` (below), Docker/Compose tooling present, and + log shipping live (Alloy → Loki; ADR-018). Little is *exposed*; a known, uniform set of + paths exists over the mesh. This is boma's answer to "what every host runs for access." +- **Service layer** (TODO 3.2). Every service role guarantees and records its paths: + container exec + compose management, its Loki log labels, and its admin API where one + exists (enabled, token in vault, endpoint + health probe documented) or explicit `n/a`. + +### The three-tier access ladder + +1. **`wt0` mesh SSH — primary.** WireGuard *cryptographically authenticates* the peer + before SSH sees it. The preferred path (ADR-016's original rationale). +2. **LAN SSH from `ubongo` — secondary, mesh-independent.** Most hardware (all but + `askari`) shares a LAN. SSH from `ubongo`'s LAN address is allowed via a new catalog + source, giving a fallback that survives a NetBird/`wt0` outage. It is gated by *source + IP* (spoofable on a LAN) **plus** the standing keys-only + fail2ban SSH hardening, so + the marginal cost is "SSH daemon reachable from the LAN broadcast domain from one + trusted host" — modest and deliberate. All *other* LAN hosts remain default-denied. +3. **Console — break-glass.** Mesh-*and*-LAN-independent, recorded per host class, not + used for routine work: + - **Cluster VMs** → Proxmox serial/VNC console (`qm terminal` / console via the + Proxmox host) — independent of the guest network, `wt0`, and even a broken guest + nftables ruleset. + - **`askari`** (bare-metal Hetzner) → provider rescue/console. + - **`ubongo`** (physical) → local console. + + A total mesh outage therefore still leaves exactly one documented way in to each box. + +## The declarative access data model (Approach B) + +Structured access facts live as **data** — the single source of truth that both renders +`ACCESS.md` *and* tells `/check-access` what to probe, so doc and verifier cannot diverge. + +### Service-layer — `access__*` in each service role's defaults + +```yaml +access__service: photoprism +access__compose_project: photoprism # docker compose -p +access__compose_path: /opt/photoprism/compose.yml +access__containers: [photoprism, photoprism-db] # exec targets +access__log: + loki_labels: { service: photoprism } # how to query logs (ADR-018) +access__api: + enabled: true + base_url: "https://photoprism.host:2342" # reachable over the mesh + firewall_ref: photoprism-api # the catalog entry that opens it (ADR-020) + auth: { type: token, vault_ref: "vault.photoprism.api_token" } + health_path: "/api/v1/status" # what /check-access pings + # where the service has no API: + # access__api: { enabled: false, reason: "" } +``` + +**Single-source-of-truth rule:** `access__api` **never opens a port**. It `firewall_ref`s +the entry in the `group_vars` firewall catalog — ADR-020 stays the sole owner of +*exposure*. The access data adds only *how to use* the path (endpoint, token ref, health +probe). No duplication, no ad-hoc ports (CLAUDE.md: ports only in the catalog). + +### Host-layer — a fixed baseline, stated once + +The host baseline (SSH on `wt0` + from `ubongo`, Docker/Compose present, Alloy live) is +uniform, so it is asserted by `base` and recorded once at the host/group level — not +re-stated per service. The break-glass console per host class is recorded with it. + +## The rendered record — `ACCESS.md` + +`ACCESS.md` is **rendered** from the `access__*` data, with a prose tail for the genuinely +narrative parts: + +- **Access paths (generated)** — a table: each path (mesh SSH, LAN-SSH-from-`ubongo`, + exec/compose, logs, API), its tier (primary / secondary / break-glass), and the exact + invocation (`ssh host`, `docker compose -p …`, the Loki query, the `curl` + against the API health path). +- **Break-glass (generated from host class)** — the Proxmox/provider console line. +- **Operational notes (prose)** — service quirks, gotchas, "if X is wedged, do Y." The + part a template cannot know. + +A `docs/access/service-access-template.md` defines the shape, alongside the existing +security/verify templates. + +## The verifier — `/check-access` (designed now, build-pending on infra) + +Runs from `ubongo`; turns the `access__*` data into live probes. Invoked +`/check-access ` (or `` for the host baseline). The access analogue of +`/verify-service` (ADR-017). + +| Path | Probe | Green = | +|---|---|---| +| `wt0` mesh SSH | connect over mesh, run `true` | reachable + key works | +| LAN SSH from `ubongo` | connect via LAN addr, run `true` | reachable + key works | +| exec + compose | `docker compose -p ps`; exec `true` in each container | stack up, exec works | +| logs | query Loki for `loki_labels`, expect recent lines | logs flowing | +| admin API | `curl` the `health_path` with the vault token | 2xx | +| break-glass | reachability of the Proxmox/provider console endpoint only | console host reachable | + +- **Break-glass is checked for reachability, not exercised** — firing a serial console is + invasive; the verifier confirms the fallback *exists* without disrupting anything. +- **Output:** a pass/fail table; on any red, it names the path and the likely cause + ("API token in vault stale", "Alloy not shipping", "`ssh-from-control` catalog source + missing"). The payoff: not "the doc *says* you can get in" but "verified — three of four + paths green right now, here's the broken one." +- **Status:** designed now, build-pending on infra (needs live hosts + staging + vault), + exactly like `/verify-service` under ADR-017. + +## Governance — so it can't be forgotten + +Three light touches mirror how `SECURITY.md`/`VERIFY.md` are enforced: + +1. **Service checklist** (`docs/security/service-checklist.md`) gains one item: *"Access + paths declared (`access__*`), `ACCESS.md` rendered, `/check-access` green — or + deviation recorded in `accepted-risks.md`."* +2. **`new-role` runbook** (`docs/runbooks/new-role.md`) gains a step: fill `access__*`, + render `ACCESS.md`, run `/check-access`. +3. **`make new-role` scaffold** drops a stub `access__*` block + the `ACCESS.md` template + into the role — the same way roles already get `SECURITY.md`/`VERIFY.md` stubs, so it + is structurally impossible to ship a service role with no access record. + +## Repo wiring + +- **`docs/decisions/021-operational-access.md`** — the new ADR (doctrine, both layers, + the three-tier ladder, break-glass, the `access__*` model, `/check-access`). +- **`docs/decisions/016-mesh-vpn.md`** — amend: SSH on `wt0` **and** from `ubongo`'s LAN + address (was mesh-only). Cross-link ADR-021. +- **`docs/decisions/020-firewall.md`** — note the new `ssh-from-control` symbolic source. +- **`docs/access/service-access-template.md`** — the rendered `ACCESS.md` shape. +- **`docs/security/service-checklist.md`** — the one new gate item. +- **`docs/runbooks/new-role.md`** — the fill/render/`check-access` step. +- **`CLAUDE.md`** — `ACCESS.md` under "Role conventions"; ADR-021 in Further reading. +- **`STATUS.md`** — rows: ADR-021 doctrine *(designed)*; `ssh-from-control` catalog source + *(designed, builds with `base` firewall)*; `/check-access` *(designed, build-pending)*. +- **`docs/TODO.md`** — mark 3.2 and 7.2 DECIDED → ADR-021. + +## What is buildable now vs later + +- **Now:** the doctrine, ADR-021, the `ACCESS.md` template, the checklist/runbook/scaffold + wiring, and the `ssh-from-control` catalog source (the `firewall` concern of `base` + already exists, so the source can land with it). +- **Later (build-pending on infra):** `/check-access` *running*, and per-service + `ACCESS.md` *files* — both wait on service roles + live hosts. Designed now, built when + there is something to verify. + +## Out of scope + +- Building `base`'s non-firewall concerns, any service role, or live hosts. +- Broader LAN SSH (a management VLAN) — explicitly rejected; `ubongo`-only. +- Exercising (vs reachability-probing) the break-glass console. +- Any access path that is not over the mesh or the one `ubongo` LAN source.