ADR-013 sets how boma draws on AnsibleBaobabV4 without inheriting it:
translate-don't-transplant — V4 is evidence, never authority. It is a legitimate
source only of operational gotchas and working config snippets (re-derived on
boma's terms); never requirements, domain values, structure, or conventions.
Provenance stays transient (commits/conversation), durable docs stay clean. AI
consultation guardrails included. Resolves TODO 3.3 and 10.1.
Also bring ADR-011 (update management, Proposed draft) under version control:
- fix its "reuse V4's ntfy topics" line to "boma defines its own" (ADR-013)
- track its 6 open questions in TODO 16, plus a 7th: reconcile its tags-not-digests
pinning with the digest-pinning the security work now mandates (R1 / checklist /
15.6) — they currently conflict.
CLAUDE.md gains a V4 guardrail + ADR-013 pointer.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Walked the seeded accepted-risk register (R1-R4) and turned inherited gaps into
deliberate decisions:
- Supply chain (R1): tightened to required baseline hygiene (digest pinning,
official/verified images); active scanning deferred — stays an accepted risk
- CIS (R2): adopted as a positive decision — CIS Debian L1+L2 (base role) + CIS
Docker (docker_host + service checklist); app layer via the checklist
- SELinux/AppArmor (R3): AppArmor becomes a baseline control (CIS-enforced);
register keeps a clean "no SELinux" accept
- IDS (R4): adopt AIDE (baseline via CIS) + Suricata on OPNsense + active alerting
Register shrinks from 4 inherited gaps to 2 deliberate accepts. ADR-002 gains a
Hardening standard section; STATUS + TODO 15 track the (unbuilt) implementation,
including the CIS L2 partition impact on VM provisioning (ADR-006).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add a managerial security frame on top of the host baseline: explicit threat
model (opportunistic external, lateral movement/blast radius, operator/agent
error; supply chain accepted-lower-priority), security principles, and four
governance mechanisms that ADR-002 establishes and links out to:
- docs/security/service-checklist.md — per-service security bar (referenced
from the new-role runbook)
- docs/security/accepted-risks.md — living accepted-risk register (R1-R4)
- planned /security-review skill (TODO 8.5)
- agent guardrails in CLAUDE.md "what Claude must not do"
STATUS.md records the frame as present (manual enforcement) and /security-review
as planned-not-built.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Brainstormed design for docs/hardware/reference.md (physical compute +
network gear + workload placement intent), a stdlib-only capacity-scan.py,
and an on-demand /capacity-review skill that reports to docs/hardware/reviews/.
Mirrors the repo-scan -> /review-repo -> docs/reviews triad.
TODO additions: schedule /capacity-review later and decide its usage-stats
source (Proxmox RRD vs the Prometheus/Loki/Grafana/Alloy stack) before
building any hook (8.4); reevaluate the stdlib-only script policy (#14).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
docs/FRICTION.md: a running log of friction/gotchas/recurring-fixes/unused tooling,
seeded with this session's real signals — raw material for the periodic kaizen
review. docs/TODO.md: schedule building /retro in ~1 week, and record the Claude-setup
decision. (Also carries your earlier backlog edits.)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Point ADR-005, the new-host runbook, CONTRIBUTING, and AGENTS at the
rbw/Vaultwarden flow instead of a .vault_pass file. Also record the cron-section
idea in docs/TODO.md.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Match the uppercase convention of the other top-level docs; includes the new
Scheduled-work and sanity-check items, and repoints references in STATUS.md and
the /review-repo command.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
