Walked the seeded accepted-risk register (R1-R4) and turned inherited gaps into
deliberate decisions:
- Supply chain (R1): tightened to required baseline hygiene (digest pinning,
official/verified images); active scanning deferred — stays an accepted risk
- CIS (R2): adopted as a positive decision — CIS Debian L1+L2 (base role) + CIS
Docker (docker_host + service checklist); app layer via the checklist
- SELinux/AppArmor (R3): AppArmor becomes a baseline control (CIS-enforced);
register keeps a clean "no SELinux" accept
- IDS (R4): adopt AIDE (baseline via CIS) + Suricata on OPNsense + active alerting
Register shrinks from 4 inherited gaps to 2 deliberate accepts. ADR-002 gains a
Hardening standard section; STATUS + TODO 15 track the (unbuilt) implementation,
including the CIS L2 partition impact on VM provisioning (ADR-006).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add a managerial security frame on top of the host baseline: explicit threat
model (opportunistic external, lateral movement/blast radius, operator/agent
error; supply chain accepted-lower-priority), security principles, and four
governance mechanisms that ADR-002 establishes and links out to:
- docs/security/service-checklist.md — per-service security bar (referenced
from the new-role runbook)
- docs/security/accepted-risks.md — living accepted-risk register (R1-R4)
- planned /security-review skill (TODO 8.5)
- agent guardrails in CLAUDE.md "what Claude must not do"
STATUS.md records the frame as present (manual enforcement) and /security-review
as planned-not-built.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
