Bare 'nft list ruleset' has no leading flush, so the timer's 'nft -f rollback'
was a no-op on first apply (empty file) and errored ('table exists') on later
applies — the auto-rollback silently did nothing, defeating the askari lockout
safeguard. Prepend 'flush ruleset' so the revert is atomic + self-contained.
Verified the snapshot->lockout->revert round-trip in an isolated netns.
Also fix stale STATUS prose (base is partially built, not absent).
ubongo, the NetBird mesh, and Level 4 verification are design-resolved
(ADR-015/016/017 + specs + plans); STATUS now says so while keeping build
status honest. Also resolves ADR-015 deferred #2 (browser harness), which
was left open when ADR-017 landed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Revise ADR-004 to a service-role standard: every service is its own
self-contained role with a required file set including SECURITY.md, uniform
deploy mechanics, and a deferred shared-engine option (with revisit trigger)
recorded in the ADR.
Add the per-service security record:
- docs/security/service-security-template.md — canonical SECURITY.md template
(exposure, checklist status, service-specific hardening, residual risks)
- roles/<service>/SECURITY.md is where each service records how it meets the bar;
/security-review aggregates roles/*/SECURITY.md and cross-checks against config
- service-checklist.md noted as the generic bar the record answers
Wire-up: new-role runbook step writes SECURITY.md from the template; ADR-002
governance bullet points at it; CLAUDE.md role conventions require it and mandate
one-role-per-service; STATUS records the convention as defined-not-yet-applied.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Walked the seeded accepted-risk register (R1-R4) and turned inherited gaps into
deliberate decisions:
- Supply chain (R1): tightened to required baseline hygiene (digest pinning,
official/verified images); active scanning deferred — stays an accepted risk
- CIS (R2): adopted as a positive decision — CIS Debian L1+L2 (base role) + CIS
Docker (docker_host + service checklist); app layer via the checklist
- SELinux/AppArmor (R3): AppArmor becomes a baseline control (CIS-enforced);
register keeps a clean "no SELinux" accept
- IDS (R4): adopt AIDE (baseline via CIS) + Suricata on OPNsense + active alerting
Register shrinks from 4 inherited gaps to 2 deliberate accepts. ADR-002 gains a
Hardening standard section; STATUS + TODO 15 track the (unbuilt) implementation,
including the CIS L2 partition impact on VM provisioning (ADR-006).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add a managerial security frame on top of the host baseline: explicit threat
model (opportunistic external, lateral movement/blast radius, operator/agent
error; supply chain accepted-lower-priority), security principles, and four
governance mechanisms that ADR-002 establishes and links out to:
- docs/security/service-checklist.md — per-service security bar (referenced
from the new-role runbook)
- docs/security/accepted-risks.md — living accepted-risk register (R1-R4)
- planned /security-review skill (TODO 8.5)
- agent guardrails in CLAUDE.md "what Claude must not do"
STATUS.md records the frame as present (manual enforcement) and /security-review
as planned-not-built.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
R6/R7: ADR-003 & ADR-008 CI pipelines rewritten trunk-based (push to main ->
test -> staging -> [manual gate] production); CLAUDE.md no longer forbids pushing
to main. R8: STATUS/roles-README/site.yml now say base & docker_host are not built
(not in git), so a clean clone errors. R15/R16: ADR-001 table flagged as intended
design; dropped the unbuilt 'monitoring agent' from the baseline.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
First /review-repo run on boma. Hardened repo-scan.py (no TODO.md/prose false
positives). Applied 7 safe fixes (DNS staleness x2, STATUS factual correction,
hosts.yml path generalisation, trunk-based wording x2, scripts/README). Recorded
the run and 17 open findings in docs/reviews/2026-05-30-*.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Match the uppercase convention of the other top-level docs; includes the new
Scheduled-work and sanity-check items, and repoints references in STATUS.md and
the /review-repo command.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
New on-demand repo audit: scripts/repo-scan.py does the cheap deterministic
checks (markers, broken refs, unencrypted vaults) and inventory; the command
fans out judgement reviewers across four dimensions, applies only safe/obvious
fixes, and writes a tracked report to docs/reviews/. Cron + email deferred.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Master vault password is fetched from Vaultwarden via the rbw agent
(scripts/vault-pass-client.sh, wired as vault_password_file) instead of a
plaintext .vault_pass. Vault secrets use a nested vault.<service>.<key> map.
Encrypted vault.yml files are excluded from lint. Includes the host rename in
Makefile and STATUS.md.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
