Makefile

@@ -44,8 +44,8 @@ help:
 	@echo "  make lint                          Run yamllint + ansible-lint"
 	@echo "  make test ROLE=<name>              Run Molecule tests for a role"
 	@echo "  make test-all                      Run Molecule tests for all roles"
-	@echo "  make check PLAYBOOK=<name> [LIMIT=<host>] [TAGS=<tags>]   Dry-run a playbook (check mode)"
+	@echo "  make check PLAYBOOK=<name>         Dry-run a playbook (check mode)"
-	@echo "  make deploy PLAYBOOK=<name> [LIMIT=<host>] [TAGS=<tags>]  Run a playbook against production"
+	@echo "  make deploy PLAYBOOK=<name>        Run a playbook against production"
 	@echo "  make edit-vault [VAULT=<path>]     Edit the vault in nvim (auto re-encrypts + checks)"
 	@echo "  make check-vault [VAULT=<path>]    Validate vault structure (values masked)"
 	@echo "  make encrypt FILE=<path>           Encrypt a vault file"
@@ -103,13 +103,13 @@ check:
 ifndef PLAYBOOK
 	$(error PLAYBOOK is required: make check PLAYBOOK=<name>)
 endif
-	$(PLAYBOOK_BIN) $(INVENTORY) $(VAULT_ARGS) $(if $(LIMIT),--limit $(LIMIT)) $(if $(TAGS),--tags $(TAGS)) --check --diff playbooks/$(PLAYBOOK).yml
+	$(PLAYBOOK_BIN) $(INVENTORY) $(VAULT_ARGS) --check --diff playbooks/$(PLAYBOOK).yml
 
 deploy:
 ifndef PLAYBOOK
 	$(error PLAYBOOK is required: make deploy PLAYBOOK=<name>)
 endif
-	$(PLAYBOOK_BIN) $(INVENTORY) $(VAULT_ARGS) $(if $(LIMIT),--limit $(LIMIT)) $(if $(TAGS),--tags $(TAGS)) playbooks/$(PLAYBOOK).yml
+	$(PLAYBOOK_BIN) $(INVENTORY) $(VAULT_ARGS) playbooks/$(PLAYBOOK).yml
 
 # ── Vault ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 

STATUS.md

@@ -30,13 +30,13 @@ _Last reviewed: 2026-06-14._
 | `make check` / `make deploy PLAYBOOK=<name>` | **Works.** First end-to-end run (applying `dev_env`) surfaced + fixed latent bugs: Makefile `PLAYBOOK` var collision (binary path vs playbook-name arg) meant the targets never ran; `ansible.cfg` referenced uninstalled community.general callbacks (now built-in `default` + `ansible.posix.profile_tasks`); `acl` package added so Ansible can `become_user` an unprivileged user. The make targets now function — though `site`/`base`/`docker_host` content is still incomplete (see below). |
 | `roles/public_dns/` + `playbooks/dns.yml` | **Built + applied.** Manages wingu.me at Gandi LiveDNS as code (`community.general.gandi_livedns`, PAT from `vault.gandi.pat`); record data, anti-spoof baseline (SPF `-all` + DMARC reject), and the Gandi-defaults purge are defined + unit-tested (`tests/test_public_dns.py`). **Applied to wingu.me (2026-06-14):** purged Gandi's 13 seeded defaults; zone now holds only the SPF + DMARC TXT records; idempotent re-run clean. No null-MX (Gandi rejects `0 .`) — the MX is removed, so no MX + no apex A = no mail. M1 of the roadmap. |
 | `ubongo` — physical control / AI-worker host (ADR-015) | **Built (partial).** Debian 13.5 on a Lenovo M70q (i3-10100T, 16 GB, 256 GB SSD; no disk encryption — accepted risk). Full toolchain installed + pinned to `fisi` (Docker 29.5.3, rbw 1.15.0, Claude Code 2.1.173, ansible-core 2.17.14 + molecule via `make setup`/`make collections`). Repo cloned under a dedicated `claude` user (docker group, no sudo). Vault works via rbw (offline-cache decryption verified). SSH key-only (password + root login disabled). In the production inventory `control` group at 10.20.10.151. **`dev_env` now applied here** (zsh/tmux/nvim for `sjat` + `claude`, via `playbooks/workstation.yml`). Managed as the operator account `sjat` (`group_vars/control` sets `ansible_user: sjat`), not the `ansible` service user `group_vars/all` assumes — ubongo has no bootstrapped `ansible` user. **Pending:** NetBird mesh enrollment (so SSH is LAN-only); full `base` hardening (only the `firewall` concern exists, and it is NOT applied here — applying default-deny with no mesh would lock out inbound SSH on the physical NIC); proper `ansible`-user bootstrap (currently managed as `sjat`); OPNsense DHCP reservation for 10.20.10.151 (MAC `88:a4:c2:e0:ee:da`); Terraform state backup (now relevant — the offsite tfstate exists). |
-| `askari` — off-site Hetzner VPS (ADR-007/016, M2) | **Built + applied.** Provisioned by Terraform (`environments/offsite`, `hetznercloud/hcloud`) as **cx23 / hel1 / Debian 13.5** (CAX11/ARM was out of stock EU-wide on 2026-06-14 → cx23 is same-spec x86, cheaper). cloud-init created the `ansible` user + passwordless sudo; a TF-managed Hetzner Cloud Firewall allows SSH only from ubongo's WAN (`91.226.145.80`). Reachable from ubongo (`ansible offsite_hosts -m ping` ✓), in the `offsite_hosts` inventory (generated `offsite.yml`), published at `askari.wingu.me` → `77.42.120.136`. **SSH-hardened + fail2ban (M3 `hardening` concern applied).** **Pending:** NetBird coordinator (M4), host firewall + mesh enrollment (M5), offsite tfstate backup (ADR-022). |
+| `askari` — off-site Hetzner VPS (ADR-007/016, M2) | **Built + applied.** Provisioned by Terraform (`environments/offsite`, `hetznercloud/hcloud`) as **cx23 / hel1 / Debian 13.5** (CAX11/ARM was out of stock EU-wide on 2026-06-14 → cx23 is same-spec x86, cheaper). cloud-init created the `ansible` user + passwordless sudo; a TF-managed Hetzner Cloud Firewall allows SSH only from ubongo's WAN (`91.226.145.80`). Reachable from ubongo (`ansible offsite_hosts -m ping` ✓), in the `offsite_hosts` inventory (generated `offsite.yml`), published at `askari.wingu.me` → `77.42.120.136`. **Pending:** `base` hardening (M3), NetBird coordinator (M4), offsite tfstate backup (ADR-022). |
 
 ## Scaffolded but empty — NOT implemented
 
 | Thing | State |
 |---|---|
-| `roles/base/` | **Partially built.** Concerns built: `firewall` (nftables: catalog-driven default-deny + east-west allowlist + auto-rollback apply; ADR-020) and **`hardening`** (M3: sshd drop-in key-only + `PermitRootLogin no`, fail2ban sshd jail 5/1h; ADR-002) — both pytest/Molecule-tested. The **`hardening`** concern is **applied to askari** (`make deploy PLAYBOOK=site LIMIT=askari TAGS=hardening`). The `firewall` concern is built but **not yet applied** to any host (mesh-gated to avoid lockout — M5). Not built: auditd, packages, users (Phase 2 / TODO 15). |
+| `roles/base/` | **Partially built.** The `firewall` concern is implemented (nftables: catalog-driven default-deny + east-west allowlist + auto-rollback apply; ADR-020) with pytest + Molecule render/syntax tests. Other concerns (SSH hardening, fail2ban, auditd, packages, users) are **not** built yet, so `make deploy PLAYBOOK=site` has no real content to apply (the make target itself now works — see "Real and working today"). |
 | `roles/docker_host/` | **Scaffolded, no tasks.** In git (meta/README/molecule filled), wired into `playbooks/site.yml` so the standard state is expressed end-to-end and `make lint` covers it, but it has no tasks yet — applying it is a no-op. Planned scope (Docker engine + Compose, daemon hardening, `nftables.d` container rules) in ADR-004/ADR-020. |
 | `inventories/*/hosts.yml` | Structured stubs with empty host maps (`hosts: {}`); regenerated by `make tf-inventory` once Terraform has hosts |
 | `inventories/production/group_vars/{docker_hosts,proxmox_hosts}/` | Empty dirs |

docs/FRICTION.md

@@ -21,20 +21,6 @@ earning its keep.
 
 _(append new raw signals here; the next kaizen review consumes them)_
 
-- `[gotcha]` **A tag on `include_tasks` does NOT reach the included tasks — need
-  `apply: {tags:}`** (2026-06-14): M3's `base/tasks/main.yml` tagged the ssh/fail2ban
-  `include_tasks` with `hardening`, but `make deploy … TAGS=hardening` ran *nothing*
-  (`ok=3 changed=0`) — a tag on a dynamic include selects the include, not its contents.
-  Fix: `include_tasks: {file: x.yml, apply: {tags: [hardening]}}`. The same latent bug sat
-  in the firewall include (never hit — firewall was only ever run untagged). Also the
-  check-mode artifact: a `service`/handler for a not-yet-installed package fails in a
-  first-run `--check` → guard with `when: not ansible_check_mode`. Both caught only by the
-  **live `make check`/`deploy` on askari** — Molecule converges *untagged*, so it can't
-  catch tag-propagation. 3rd reinforcement (after M1 `item.values`, M2 TF
-  `required_providers`) that live execution catches what review + container tests miss.
-  → when a role uses tags to apply concern-subsets, `apply:` is mandatory on its includes;
-  consider an ansible-lint/CI check that `make deploy … TAGS=<concern>` actually changes things.
-
 - `[gotcha]` **Terraform child modules need their own `required_providers` for
   non-hashicorp providers** (2026-06-14): `terraform init` for the `offsite` env failed —
   the `hetzner_vm` module used `hcloud_*` resources with no `required_providers` block, so

docs/ROADMAP.md

@@ -92,20 +92,17 @@ it. Design: `docs/superpowers/specs/2026-06-14-askari-provisioning-design.md`.
 - **Amends:** ADR-006 (TF scope), ADR-009 (offsite handoff), ADR-020 (Hetzner Cloud
   Firewall = perimeter), ADR-007/016 (`askari` TF-provisioned, not "added manually").
 
-### M3 · `base` matured to a "remote-access-sufficient" subset — ✅ DONE
+### M3 · `base` matured to a "remote-access-sufficient" subset
 
-Added the `hardening` concern to `base` (sshd drop-in key-only + `PermitRootLogin no`;
+Today `base` is firewall-only. Add the subset a real, internet-facing host needs:
-fail2ban sshd jail 5/1h; ADR-002) and **applied it to askari** by tag
+**SSH hardening + fail2ban + the NetBird agent task**. Full CIS L1/L2, auditd, AppArmor,
-(`make deploy PLAYBOOK=site LIMIT=askari TAGS=hardening`) — SSH still works, fail2ban
+AIDE are deferred to Phase 2.
-active. Full CIS L1/L2, auditd, AppArmor, AIDE remain deferred to Phase 2 (TODO 15).
 
-- **NetBird agent → M4** (deferred from M3: it enrolls against the coordinator, which
+- **Why a subset:** `askari` is public (Hetzner) — it must be SSH-hardened and firewalled
-  doesn't exist until M4 — ADR-016's coordinator-first bootstrap order).
+  *with* exposure, but the full hardening standard is not on the critical path to mobile
-- **Host firewall on askari + ubongo hardening → M5** (applying default-deny pre-mesh
+  access.
-  would lock out SSH; the Hetzner Cloud Firewall is askari's perimeter until then).
+- **Maps to:** ADR-002 (security baseline), ADR-016 (agent enrollment lives in `base`),
-- **Spec/plan:** `docs/superpowers/{specs,plans}/2026-06-14-base-ssh-fail2ban-m3*`.
+  ADR-020 (firewall — already built), TODO 15 (the rest of hardening → Phase 2).
-- **Maps to:** ADR-002 (security baseline), ADR-020 (firewall — built, not yet applied),
-  TODO 15 (the rest of hardening → Phase 2).
 
 ### M4 · NetBird control plane on `askari` — first real service role
 

inventories/production/group_vars/all/vars.yml

@@ -8,8 +8,7 @@ ansible_python_interpreter: /usr/bin/python3
 
 # SSH authorised keys — add one entry per person
 # Format: "ssh-ed25519 AAAA... user@host"
-base__ssh_authorised_keys:
+base__ssh_authorised_keys: []
-  - "ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIKSx1TFLJ9H8vCe5ZJSu7MYmAiH0/OC8evloQjGR0Bqw claude@ubongo"
 
 # Timezone
 base__timezone: Europe/Copenhagen

roles/base/defaults/main.yml

@@ -11,12 +11,3 @@ base__firewall_rollback_timeout: 45  # seconds before the auto-revert fires on a
 base__firewall_confirm_timeout: 20   # seconds to re-establish a fresh connection post-apply
 base__firewall_dropin_dir: /etc/nftables.d
 base__firewall_apply: true           # set false to render+validate without applying (CI/Molecule)
-
-# SSH hardening + fail2ban (ADR-002) — `hardening` concern.
-base__ssh_password_authentication: "no"
-base__ssh_permit_root_login: "no"
-base__fail2ban_maxretry: 5
-base__fail2ban_bantime: 1h
-base__fail2ban_findtime: 10m
-# base__ssh_authorised_keys lives in group_vars/all/vars.yml (per-person control keys).
-base__ssh_authorised_keys: []

roles/base/handlers/main.yml

@@ -1,13 +1 @@
 ---
-- name: Reload sshd
-  listen: reload sshd
-  ansible.builtin.service:
-    name: ssh
-    state: reloaded
-
-- name: Restart fail2ban
-  listen: restart fail2ban
-  ansible.builtin.service:
-    name: fail2ban
-    state: restarted
-  when: not ansible_check_mode   # fail2ban isn't installed during a first-run --check

roles/base/molecule/default/verify.yml

@@ -47,18 +47,3 @@
     - name: Syntax-check the rendered ruleset (no apply)
       ansible.builtin.command: nft -c -f /etc/nftables.conf
       changed_when: false
-
-    - name: Sshd drop-in present and config valid
-      ansible.builtin.command: sshd -t
-      changed_when: false
-      tags: [verify]
-
-    - name: PasswordAuthentication is disabled
-      ansible.builtin.command: grep -q '^PasswordAuthentication no' /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/10-boma.conf
-      changed_when: false
-      tags: [verify]
-
-    - name: Fail2ban sshd jail configured
-      ansible.builtin.command: grep -q '^\[sshd\]' /etc/fail2ban/jail.d/sshd.local
-      changed_when: false
-      tags: [verify]

roles/base/tasks/fail2ban.yml

@@ -1,25 +0,0 @@
----
-- name: Install fail2ban
-  ansible.builtin.apt:
-    name: fail2ban
-    state: present
-    update_cache: true
-
-- name: Configure the sshd jail
-  ansible.builtin.template:
-    src: fail2ban_sshd.local.j2
-    dest: /etc/fail2ban/jail.d/sshd.local
-    owner: root
-    group: root
-    mode: "0644"
-  notify: restart fail2ban
-
-- name: Enable and start fail2ban
-  ansible.builtin.service:
-    name: fail2ban
-    enabled: true
-    state: started
-  # In --check on a host without fail2ban yet, the package isn't really installed, so the
-  # service lookup fails. Skip the start in check mode (the install + jail are still
-  # previewed); a real deploy installs then starts it.
-  when: not ansible_check_mode

roles/base/tasks/main.yml

@@ -1,24 +1,4 @@
 ---
-# `apply: tags:` propagates the concern tag to the INCLUDED tasks — without it a tag on
-# a dynamic include_tasks only selects the include itself, not its contents, so
-# `--tags <concern>` would run nothing (Ansible gotcha).
 - name: Configure host firewall (nftables)
-  ansible.builtin.include_tasks:
+  ansible.builtin.include_tasks: firewall.yml
-    file: firewall.yml
-    apply:
-      tags: [firewall]
   tags: [firewall]
-
-- name: SSH hardening
-  ansible.builtin.include_tasks:
-    file: ssh.yml
-    apply:
-      tags: [hardening]
-  tags: [hardening]
-
-- name: Fail2ban intrusion deterrence
-  ansible.builtin.include_tasks:
-    file: fail2ban.yml
-    apply:
-      tags: [hardening]
-  tags: [hardening]

roles/base/tasks/ssh.yml

@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
----
-- name: Ensure openssh-server is installed
-  ansible.builtin.apt:
-    name: openssh-server
-    state: present
-    update_cache: true
-
-- name: Render hardened sshd drop-in
-  ansible.builtin.template:
-    src: sshd_hardening.conf.j2
-    dest: /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/10-boma.conf
-    owner: root
-    group: root
-    mode: "0644"
-  notify: reload sshd
-
-- name: Ensure sshd privilege-separation directory exists (required for sshd -t)
-  ansible.builtin.file:
-    path: /run/sshd
-    state: directory
-    owner: root
-    group: root
-    mode: "0755"
-
-- name: Validate the full sshd config (drop-in included)
-  ansible.builtin.command: sshd -t
-  changed_when: false
-
-- name: Authorise control SSH keys for the ansible user
-  ansible.posix.authorized_key:
-    user: "{{ ansible_user | default('ansible') }}"
-    key: "{{ base__ssh_authorised_keys | join('\n') }}"
-    exclusive: true
-  when: base__ssh_authorised_keys | length > 0

roles/base/templates/fail2ban_sshd.local.j2

@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
-# Managed by Ansible (base role, ADR-002).
-[sshd]
-enabled  = true
-maxretry = {{ base__fail2ban_maxretry }}
-bantime  = {{ base__fail2ban_bantime }}
-findtime = {{ base__fail2ban_findtime }}

roles/base/templates/sshd_hardening.conf.j2

@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
-# Managed by Ansible (base role, ADR-002). Do not edit on the host.
-PasswordAuthentication {{ base__ssh_password_authentication }}
-PermitRootLogin {{ base__ssh_permit_root_login }}
-PubkeyAuthentication yes
-KbdInteractiveAuthentication no