# Security — netbird_coordinator (NetBird control plane)

## Exposure

- **Published ports:**
  - `443/tcp` — **not host-published**; reached via the M4a Caddy reverse proxy on the
    `boma` Docker network. Caddy fronts the dashboard SPA, the management REST API
    (`/api`), the embedded Dex IdP (`/oauth2`), native gRPC over h2c
    (`/management.ManagementService/*`, `/signalexchange.SignalExchange/*`), and the
    relay WebSocket (`/relay*`, `/ws-proxy/*`). TLS terminates at Caddy (Let's Encrypt
    HTTP-01); upstreams listen plain `:80` on the internal network only.
  - `3478/udp` — **STUN, host-published directly** (`netbird-server`'s only host port),
    bypassing Caddy because STUN is UDP and not HTTP.
  - The **Hetzner Cloud Firewall already opens 80/443/3478** (done in M4a) — this role
    adds **no** new firewall change. The host nftables `firewall_catalog` (ADR-020)
    stays empty for askari; the cloud firewall is the authoritative edge here.
  - In-container only, never published: metrics `:9090`, healthcheck `:9000`.
- **Auth surface:** the **embedded Dex IdP** shipped inside `netbird-server` (served at
  `/oauth2`). The dashboard authenticates as a **public PKCE OIDC client**
  (`AUTH_CLIENT_ID=netbird-dashboard`, **no client secret** — intentionally empty). The
  management REST/gRPC API is behind Dex-issued JWTs. The **first admin user is created
  via a one-time `/setup` page on first boot**, reachable only while zero users exist;
  once an admin exists, `/setup` is closed. Peer enrolment uses **setup keys** minted in
  the dashboard after login (used in M5, not part of this provisioning).
- **Reachability:** public — askari is internet-facing. The HTTP surface is reachable
  only through Caddy (single public entry point, ADR-024); STUN/3478-udp is reachable
  directly on askari's public IP. The management API controls the whole mesh, so this is
  a deliberate public attack surface (see accepted risk **R3** below).
- **Data sensitivity:** **stateful** — holds the entire mesh control-plane state (peers,
  setup keys, ACLs, IdP users) in an **encrypted SQLite datastore** at `/var/lib/netbird`
  in the `netbird_data` volume. The datastore is encrypted with
  `vault.netbird.datastore_key`; a restore needs **both** the volume **and** that key.
  See backup record: `BACKUP.md` (`backup__state: true`).

## Checklist status

Each item from `docs/security/service-checklist.md`:

- [x] Secrets in vault; no default creds; nothing secret in git/images — ✅ two secrets
  come from the vault (`vault.netbird.auth_secret`, `vault.netbird.datastore_key`),
  rendered into host-side `config.yaml` (mode `0640`, task `no_log: true`). No default
  creds: the first admin is bootstrapped interactively via `/setup`; the dashboard's
  OIDC client secret is intentionally empty (public PKCE), not a leaked credential.
- [x] Non-root; no `privileged`/host-network unless justified; minimal mounts; caps
  dropped — ⚠️ both containers run the upstream images' default user; no `privileged`,
  no host networking (bridge `boma`). `netbird-server` mounts the read-only `config.yaml`
  (`:ro`) and the `netbird_data` named volume; it publishes only `3478/udp`. Hardening
  is the upstream default; revisit if NetBird documents a rootless/cap-drop posture.
- [x] Ports declared; behind reverse proxy + auth if exposed; least-privilege
  inter-service reach — ✅ the HTTP surface (443) is behind Caddy + Dex auth; STUN/3478
  is intentionally direct (UDP, can't proxy) and opened only at the Hetzner Cloud
  Firewall (M4a). Containers reach Caddy by name on the `boma` network; nothing else is
  published.
- [x] Image pinned (tag/digest), update path known — ⚠️ stateful tier (ADR-011) — pinned
  to exact tags `netbirdio/netbird-server:0.72.4` and `netbirdio/dashboard:v2.39.0`, not
  yet `tag@digest`. Watched by DIUN; bumped deliberately on boma's cadence (ADR-011).
  Tighten to digests when convenient.
- [x] Logs reviewable; backup/restore covered if stateful — ✅ `docker logs
  netbird-server` / `netbird-dashboard` now (json-file driver capped at 500m×2 since the
  default never rotates), Loki labels declared for the ADR-018 pipeline. Stateful: backup
  is declared in `BACKUP.md` but **not yet captured** (pending the fisi pull node — see
  Residual risks).

## Service-specific hardening

- **Trusted-proxy pinning:** `server.reverseProxy.trustedHTTPProxies` is set from
  `netbird_coordinator__trusted_proxies` so NetBird honours `X-Forwarded-*` **only** from
  Caddy's source range on the `boma` bridge — rendered via `to_json` so an empty override
  becomes `[]` (trust nothing), never YAML `null`. Tighten the range to Caddy's actual
  container subnet at deploy (`docker network inspect boma`).
- **`/setup` self-closes:** the one-time admin-bootstrap page is reachable only while the
  IdP has zero users — first login closes the window, so there is no standing
  unauthenticated admin-creation route.
- **No standing unauthenticated admin surface:** the management REST/gRPC API requires a
  Dex-issued JWT; metrics (`:9090`) and healthcheck (`:9000`) are in-container only and
  never published (`access__api` describes the authenticated path).
- **Secrets never reach the dashboard or work tree:** `config.yaml` (with both secrets)
  is rendered `0640` with `no_log`; `dashboard.env` carries no secrets (public client).

## Residual / accepted risks

- **Public mesh control plane on askari** — the management API + dashboard (443 via
  Caddy) and STUN (3478/udp) are exposed on askari's public IP; the management API
  controls the whole mesh. Accepted as **R3** in `docs/security/accepted-risks.md`
  (self-hosting = no third-party trust + an off-site control plane that survives a
  homelab outage). Mitigated by TLS + embedded-Dex login, trusted-proxy pinning, `base`
  hardening, and version-pinned NetBird patched on boma's cadence. Revisit per R3's
  trigger (a coordinator compromise / unpatched NetBird CVE, or the management plane
  becoming reachable without auth). *(Note: R3's text says "Coturn (UDP 3478)"; the
  v0.72.4 combined server actually exposes plain STUN on 3478/udp with no Coturn — same
  port and surface, no functional difference to the accepted risk.)*
- **Off-site backup not yet captured** — the service is stateful (`backup__state: true`)
  but the restic/`fisi` pull pipeline (ADR-022 Plan 2) is not built. Until then, the
  encrypted datastore is **not** backed up off-host: a loss of askari loses the mesh
  control-plane state (recoverable only by re-bootstrapping a fresh coordinator and
  re-enrolling peers). Accepted for now; revisit when `fisi` lands. See `BACKUP.md`.
- **Images pinned to tags, not digests** — stateful tier wants `tag@digest` (ADR-011);
  currently exact tags. Revisit when convenient.