boma/tests/integration/overrides/askari_inputonly.yml
sjat 1042f161b6 test(integration): askari_inputonly — INPUT-only default-deny reboot gate
Adds the ADR-025 integration-test profile that proves the askari
mesh-hardening REDESIGN (INPUT-only default-deny, forward ACCEPT for Docker)
is reboot-safe on a throwaway KVM VM before the live cut-over.

Profile applies base (firewall + sshd) and offsite (docker_host +
reverse_proxy). Post-reboot verify checks: input policy drop, forward
policy accept, admin-addr break-glass SSH (192.168.150.1), Docker up,
and a published port answered from the controller. GREEN on 2026-06-19.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-19 19:14:55 +02:00

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YAML

---
# Integration overlay (ADR-025) — the askari mesh-hardening REDESIGN (2026-06-19).
# Validates INPUT-only default-deny on a Docker host: input policy drop, forward policy
# accept (Docker-safe), SSH via the admin-addr break-glass, reboot-survivable.
integration_profile: askari_inputonly
base__firewall_apply: true
base__firewall_input_only: true
# No sshd ListenAddress change — never wt0-only in a throwaway VM.
base__ssh_listen_mesh_only: false
# Isolated VM: never touch the real mesh.
base__mesh_enabled: false
# The non-mesh SSH break-glass = the admin-addr path the real design uses. Point it at the
# VM's libvirt-NAT gateway (where the harness connects from), by source IP so it is
# interface-independent and the default-deny + reboot don't lock out the driver. This
# mirrors askari's real base__firewall_admin_addrs (ubongo's WAN) in the test topology.
base__firewall_admin_addrs:
- 192.168.150.1