boma/docs/security
sjat 19dd89b875 Re-challenge accepted risks; adopt CIS hardening + IDS
Walked the seeded accepted-risk register (R1-R4) and turned inherited gaps into
deliberate decisions:

- Supply chain (R1): tightened to required baseline hygiene (digest pinning,
  official/verified images); active scanning deferred — stays an accepted risk
- CIS (R2): adopted as a positive decision — CIS Debian L1+L2 (base role) + CIS
  Docker (docker_host + service checklist); app layer via the checklist
- SELinux/AppArmor (R3): AppArmor becomes a baseline control (CIS-enforced);
  register keeps a clean "no SELinux" accept
- IDS (R4): adopt AIDE (baseline via CIS) + Suricata on OPNsense + active alerting

Register shrinks from 4 inherited gaps to 2 deliberate accepts. ADR-002 gains a
Hardening standard section; STATUS + TODO 15 track the (unbuilt) implementation,
including the CIS L2 partition impact on VM provisioning (ADR-006).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-04 15:15:39 +02:00
..
accepted-risks.md Re-challenge accepted risks; adopt CIS hardening + IDS 2026-06-04 15:15:39 +02:00
service-checklist.md Expand ADR-002 into a security baseline + strategy 2026-06-04 14:39:51 +02:00