Add dated Status sections and (where missing) Consequences sections assembled
from each ADR's already-stated implications. No decision substance changed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds role_tag_problems() to check-tags.py: every role imported in a
play's roles: block must carry its own role name as a tag (extra tags
allowed; templated role names skipped). Wires the check into main() so
make lint catches violations. 6 new unit tests (29 total, all passing).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- ADR-011: ruled-out row was "digest-pinning stateful" (contradicted Decision 2);
now "digest-only (no readable tag)" — tag@digest is adopted (O7)
- ADR-003/010: act_runner names ubongo as the runner host, runner VM as a future
option (O8)
- ADR-008: WireGuard Molecule-exclusion row reframed to NetBird wt0 data plane (O9)
- ADR-011: scheduled_jobs xref points to TODO 8.3, not ADR-010 (O10)
- CAPABILITIES: add /verify-service Level 4 capability row (O11)
- TODO 3.10: rewrite the garbled base-container question (O12)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Review O5/O6: ADR-006 mislabeled backend.tf as "Forgejo state backend" (its own
State-backend section chooses local state — Forgejo's API is read-only); ADR-014
called plugin reproducibility open though TODO 10.7 is done.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Review O4: ADR-016 said askari gets "its own inventory group" but never named it.
Settled as offsite_hosts (off-site, distinct from on-site-but-off-cluster ubongo).
Added to VALID_GROUPS (tf_to_inventory.py), ADR-009 valid groups, ADR-001/ADR-016
host-group enumerations, and CLAUDE.md. Generated hosts.yml picks up the section on
the next make tf-inventory (a manual-exception group like control).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Review O1-O3: ADR-017's per-service VERIFY.md requirement now appears in the
ADR-004 service-role file table, as a new-role runbook step, and the README
docs index/tree are refreshed (ADRs 010-017, security/testing/hardware dirs).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Auto-fixes from /review-repo:
- ADR-005 + new-host.md: drop "Terraform writes the host's DNS A record"
(contradicts ADR-009 — dns role owns the zone; recurs from the 2026-05-30 run)
- ADR-005: control node is physical ubongo, not cloned from the template (ADR-015)
- CLAUDE.md: add the VERIFY.md template to Further reading
- TODO.md: typo fixes (we we / seperate)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
ubongo, the NetBird mesh, and Level 4 verification are design-resolved
(ADR-015/016/017 + specs + plans); STATUS now says so while keeping build
status honest. Also resolves ADR-015 deferred #2 (browser harness), which
was left open when ADR-017 landed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Policy for how agents source authoritative knowledge and translate it to boma:
- Facts (version-specific syntax/options) → consult version-matched official docs,
cite, and stamp `verified: subject · tool ver · source · date`. Training memory
is the draft, never the authority.
- Judgments (best practices) → evidence to translate through boma's principles
(extends ADR-013); never adopted because the docs/a blog say so.
- Consultation is risk-based (security / unfamiliar-or-fast-moving / can't quote a
flag with confidence), with a "from memory, unverified" transparency backstop.
- Sources: context7 → WebFetch upstream → claude-code-guide → deep-research; match
the PINNED version, not "latest".
- Graceful degradation: the plugin accelerators may be absent on a fresh checkout,
so the policy commits to the principle and falls back to WebFetch/WebSearch.
CLAUDE.md gains a concise operating rule + pointer. TODO 10.4 decided. New TODO
10.7 tracks making the plugin/MCP toolchain reproducible from the repo (it is not
synced by account nor carried by git) — surfaced by a portability check this run.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Resolve the conflict between ADR-011 (tags-not-digests) and the security work
(digest pinning) with one coherent rule that respects ADR-011's stateless/stateful
split:
- Stateful → pin `tag@digest` (readable tag + integrity digest): legible diffs AND
tamper-evidence. Snapshots cover broken updates; the digest covers swapped images.
- Stateless → rolling tags (latest/stable); digest-pinning would defeat the rolling
design. Integrity rests on official/verified images + disposability.
Aligned across ADR-011 (decision 2), ADR-004 (image management), ADR-002
(supply-chain row), accepted-risk R1, the service checklist, and TODO 15.6.
TODO 16.7 marked decided.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
ADR-013 sets how boma draws on AnsibleBaobabV4 without inheriting it:
translate-don't-transplant — V4 is evidence, never authority. It is a legitimate
source only of operational gotchas and working config snippets (re-derived on
boma's terms); never requirements, domain values, structure, or conventions.
Provenance stays transient (commits/conversation), durable docs stay clean. AI
consultation guardrails included. Resolves TODO 3.3 and 10.1.
Also bring ADR-011 (update management, Proposed draft) under version control:
- fix its "reuse V4's ntfy topics" line to "boma defines its own" (ADR-013)
- track its 6 open questions in TODO 16, plus a 7th: reconcile its tags-not-digests
pinning with the digest-pinning the security work now mandates (R1 / checklist /
15.6) — they currently conflict.
CLAUDE.md gains a V4 guardrail + ADR-013 pointer.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Revise ADR-004 to a service-role standard: every service is its own
self-contained role with a required file set including SECURITY.md, uniform
deploy mechanics, and a deferred shared-engine option (with revisit trigger)
recorded in the ADR.
Add the per-service security record:
- docs/security/service-security-template.md — canonical SECURITY.md template
(exposure, checklist status, service-specific hardening, residual risks)
- roles/<service>/SECURITY.md is where each service records how it meets the bar;
/security-review aggregates roles/*/SECURITY.md and cross-checks against config
- service-checklist.md noted as the generic bar the record answers
Wire-up: new-role runbook step writes SECURITY.md from the template; ADR-002
governance bullet points at it; CLAUDE.md role conventions require it and mandate
one-role-per-service; STATUS records the convention as defined-not-yet-applied.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Walked the seeded accepted-risk register (R1-R4) and turned inherited gaps into
deliberate decisions:
- Supply chain (R1): tightened to required baseline hygiene (digest pinning,
official/verified images); active scanning deferred — stays an accepted risk
- CIS (R2): adopted as a positive decision — CIS Debian L1+L2 (base role) + CIS
Docker (docker_host + service checklist); app layer via the checklist
- SELinux/AppArmor (R3): AppArmor becomes a baseline control (CIS-enforced);
register keeps a clean "no SELinux" accept
- IDS (R4): adopt AIDE (baseline via CIS) + Suricata on OPNsense + active alerting
Register shrinks from 4 inherited gaps to 2 deliberate accepts. ADR-002 gains a
Hardening standard section; STATUS + TODO 15 track the (unbuilt) implementation,
including the CIS L2 partition impact on VM provisioning (ADR-006).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add a managerial security frame on top of the host baseline: explicit threat
model (opportunistic external, lateral movement/blast radius, operator/agent
error; supply chain accepted-lower-priority), security principles, and four
governance mechanisms that ADR-002 establishes and links out to:
- docs/security/service-checklist.md — per-service security bar (referenced
from the new-role runbook)
- docs/security/accepted-risks.md — living accepted-risk register (R1-R4)
- planned /security-review skill (TODO 8.5)
- agent guardrails in CLAUDE.md "what Claude must not do"
STATUS.md records the frame as present (manual enforcement) and /security-review
as planned-not-built.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Final-review minor: the /capacity-review skill overwrites a latest.md
pointer alongside the dated report; record that in the ADR.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
ADR-010: API tokens as least-privilege managed secrets, declarative-first (no
click-ops), automation boundary, planned trunk-based CI. CLAUDE.md/AGENTS.md:
check 'rbw unlocked' before vault-dependent tasks (incl. commits) rather than
failing partway.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Forgejo's /raw/ API is read-only so it cannot serve as a Terraform HTTP state
backend. Switch both envs to local state on the control node (ADR-006); remove
the dead TF_HTTP_* credential hints.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
R6/R7: ADR-003 & ADR-008 CI pipelines rewritten trunk-based (push to main ->
test -> staging -> [manual gate] production); CLAUDE.md no longer forbids pushing
to main. R8: STATUS/roles-README/site.yml now say base & docker_host are not built
(not in git), so a clean clone errors. R15/R16: ADR-001 table flagged as intended
design; dropped the unbuilt 'monitoring agent' from the baseline.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Point ADR-005, the new-host runbook, CONTRIBUTING, and AGENTS at the
rbw/Vaultwarden flow instead of a .vault_pass file. Also record the cron-section
idea in docs/TODO.md.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
First /review-repo run on boma. Hardened repo-scan.py (no TODO.md/prose false
positives). Applied 7 safe fixes (DNS staleness x2, STATUS factual correction,
hosts.yml path generalisation, trunk-based wording x2, scripts/README). Recorded
the run and 17 open findings in docs/reviews/2026-05-30-*.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
