sjat
349d10d65c
Move ubongo to 'Built (partial)' in STATUS; fill real M70q hardware specs (i3-10100T, 16 GB, 256 GB SanDisk X600 SATA, no disk encryption). Record in ADR-015 the dedicated claude AI-worker identity, LAN-SSH-only operational reality, and the no-encryption decision; close the rbw offline-cache recovery-verification item (ADR-015 + rotate-secrets). Add accepted-risk R5 (control-node disk unencrypted at rest) with its compensating controls. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
27 lines
4.3 KiB
Markdown
27 lines
4.3 KiB
Markdown
# Accepted security risks
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Conscious security trade-offs we are choosing to live with — recorded so "what we
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are *not* doing" is explicit and revisitable, not forgotten. This register is a
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**living document**, deliberately kept out of ADR-002 (which records durable
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decisions) so the ADR stays stable.
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Owned by **ADR-002** (Security baseline and strategy). Re-challenged during the
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periodic security review (planned `/security-review`; see `docs/TODO.md`).
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**Each entry:** the risk · why we accept it (rationale) · what would make us
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revisit (trigger).
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| # | Accepted risk | Rationale | Revisit trigger |
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|---|---|---|---|
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| R1 | **Active supply-chain scanning deferred** — baseline hygiene *is* required (tiered image pinning per ADR-011 — stateful `tag@digest`, stateless rolling — prefer official/verified images; gitleaks), but images and dependencies are not actively vulnerability-scanned (Trivy/Grype) or signature-verified | Scanning only pays off with the capacity to triage its output; the realistic threat is opportunistic, not a targeted supply-chain attack | A monitoring/triage stack is live; hosting high-value data/finances for others; a relevant upstream compromise |
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| R2 | **SELinux not used** — no SELinux mandatory access control | AppArmor — Debian-native and enforced via the CIS baseline — already provides MAC; adding SELinux means two MAC systems, non-native to Debian, for no real gain | A service that ships and requires its own SELinux policy; threat model shifts toward targeted attackers |
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| R3 | **Self-hosted mesh control plane is a public target on `askari`** — the NetBird coordinator (ADR-016) exposes a management API + dashboard (TCP 80/443) and Coturn (UDP 3478) on `askari`'s public IP; the management API controls the whole mesh | Self-hosting means **no third-party trust** and an off-site control plane that survives a homelab outage (boma's sovereignty ethos). Residual surface is on `askari` (already a public VPS) and is mitigated: TLS + embedded-IdP login, source-IP restriction where practical, `base` hardening, version-pinned NetBird (ADR-011) patched on boma's cadence | A coordinator compromise or unpatched NetBird CVE; the management plane is reachable without auth/IP-limits; the operational burden makes a hosted coordinator worth reconsidering |
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| R4 | **No cryptographic WORM for logs** — shipped logs are append-only via Loki's push API and copied off-site to `askari` (ADR-018), but the stored chunks are not object-locked/immutable; a root-on-`askari` attacker could edit history | Append-only push + off-site copy already defeats the realistic threat (a host attacker covering tracks survives even full-cluster compromise). True WORM (object-lock) is forensic-grade cost for boma's opportunistic threat model (R1) | Threat model shifts toward targeted/forensic; a regulatory/evidentiary need appears; `askari` itself is assessed as a likely target |
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| R5 | **No disk encryption on `ubongo`** — the control node's SSD (SanDisk X600 256 GB, TCG-Opal-capable but Opal unused) is unencrypted at rest, so it holds recovery-critical secrets in plaintext: the Ansible Vault password's `rbw` local cache and (future) Terraform state. Physical theft of the box would expose them | `ubongo` is always-on in a physically controlled location; compensating controls are a **BIOS supervisor password** and **disabled external/USB + PXE boot** (an attacker cannot trivially boot another OS to read the disk), and the offline-recoverable design means the irreducible root secret (Vaultwarden master password) is never stored on the box anyway. Full-disk encryption was weighed against the always-on/unattended-reboot requirement (LUKS+TPM auto-unlock or passphrase) and deferred for simplicity at this trust level | `ubongo` is relocated to a less-trusted physical location; the box starts holding additional high-value secrets; or a reinstall onto LUKS (TPM-sealed) is undertaken |
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_Last reviewed: 2026-06-11. The prior gaps (full CIS hardening, SELinux/AppArmor,
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IDS) were re-challenged and **adopted rather than accepted**: CIS Debian L1+L2 + CIS
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Docker, AppArmor (enforce), AIDE file-integrity, and Suricata network IDS are now
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part of the security strategy (ADR-002). See STATUS.md / `docs/TODO.md` for build
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status. As CIS is implemented, any specific item that proves impractical is added
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here as a named exception._
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