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Walked the seeded accepted-risk register (R1-R4) and turned inherited gaps into deliberate decisions: - Supply chain (R1): tightened to required baseline hygiene (digest pinning, official/verified images); active scanning deferred — stays an accepted risk - CIS (R2): adopted as a positive decision — CIS Debian L1+L2 (base role) + CIS Docker (docker_host + service checklist); app layer via the checklist - SELinux/AppArmor (R3): AppArmor becomes a baseline control (CIS-enforced); register keeps a clean "no SELinux" accept - IDS (R4): adopt AIDE (baseline via CIS) + Suricata on OPNsense + active alerting Register shrinks from 4 inherited gaps to 2 deliberate accepts. ADR-002 gains a Hardening standard section; STATUS + TODO 15 track the (unbuilt) implementation, including the CIS L2 partition impact on VM provisioning (ADR-006). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
24 lines
1.9 KiB
Markdown
24 lines
1.9 KiB
Markdown
# Accepted security risks
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Conscious security trade-offs we are choosing to live with — recorded so "what we
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are *not* doing" is explicit and revisitable, not forgotten. This register is a
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**living document**, deliberately kept out of ADR-002 (which records durable
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decisions) so the ADR stays stable.
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Owned by **ADR-002** (Security baseline and strategy). Re-challenged during the
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periodic security review (planned `/security-review`; see `docs/TODO.md`).
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**Each entry:** the risk · why we accept it (rationale) · what would make us
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revisit (trigger).
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| # | Accepted risk | Rationale | Revisit trigger |
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|---|---|---|---|
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| R1 | **Active supply-chain scanning deferred** — baseline hygiene *is* required (image digest pinning + prefer official/verified images, ADR-011 / service checklist; gitleaks), but images and dependencies are not actively vulnerability-scanned (Trivy/Grype) or signature-verified | Scanning only pays off with the capacity to triage its output; the realistic threat is opportunistic, not a targeted supply-chain attack | A monitoring/triage stack is live; hosting high-value data/finances for others; a relevant upstream compromise |
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| R2 | **SELinux not used** — no SELinux mandatory access control | AppArmor — Debian-native and enforced via the CIS baseline — already provides MAC; adding SELinux means two MAC systems, non-native to Debian, for no real gain | A service that ships and requires its own SELinux policy; threat model shifts toward targeted attackers |
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_Last reviewed: 2026-06-04. The prior gaps (full CIS hardening, SELinux/AppArmor,
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IDS) were re-challenged and **adopted rather than accepted**: CIS Debian L1+L2 + CIS
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Docker, AppArmor (enforce), AIDE file-integrity, and Suricata network IDS are now
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part of the security strategy (ADR-002). See STATUS.md / `docs/TODO.md` for build
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status. As CIS is implemented, any specific item that proves impractical is added
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here as a named exception._
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