boma/docs/superpowers/specs/2026-06-10-backup-strategy-design.md

# Design — Backup & disaster recovery strategy

- **Date:** 2026-06-10
- **Status:** Approved design — pending implementation plan
- **Resolves:** `docs/TODO.md` item 3.8 ("ensure the right things are backed up,
  incl. DB dumps") and `docs/CAPABILITIES.md` §9 (backup engine / off-site / air-gap,
  all "planned")
- **Grounds:** the backup substrate that ADR-011 (update management) already leans on
  ("snapshot-before + backups remain the rollback mechanism", "always dumps the DB /
  takes a backup first") but never defined
- **Reuses:** ADR-004 (one service = one role; per-service doc conventions),
  ADR-008/017 (`VERIFY.md` per-service checks), ADR-021 (`ACCESS.md` rendered from
  role `access__*` data — the same render-from-data pattern), ADR-015 (`ubongo`
  recovery model; `mamba` break-glass clone)
- **Becomes:** ADR-022 (this design is the basis for that ADR)

---

## Problem

boma has no defined backup policy. The ADRs assume one exists — ADR-011 makes
"backup-first" the rule for stateful upgrades and "snapshot + backup" the rollback
path — but nothing specifies *what* gets backed up, *how* it stays consistent, *where*
copies live, *how* they're encrypted, or *whether restores actually work*.
`CAPABILITIES.md` §9 sketches an intent (PBS + restic, pCloud off-site, USB air-gap)
but commits to nothing.

This design defines the policy end-to-end: recovery model, what is captured and how,
the 3-2-1 topology, encryption and key escrow with a break-glass path, restore
testing, retention, failure alerting, and the air-gap mechanism.

## Scope

- **In:** application *state* backup for boma's hosts and services; off-site and
  air-gapped copies; encryption + key escrow; restore testing; failure alerting;
  retention; the backup node.
- **Out (for now):** whole-VM image backup (Proxmox Backup Server) — explicitly
  deferred, see Decision 1; a central-vs-per-app database decision (TODO 3.9 — this
  design is agnostic to it); Prometheus backup metrics (noted as a later add).

## Decisions (as settled)

### 1. Recovery model — data-only backups, rebuild from code (Model A)

boma's *configuration* is reproducible from this repo: Terraform recreates the VM,
Ansible re-renders the Docker Compose stack. So backups protect **state only** — DB
contents, bind-mount data dirs, Vaultwarden's vault — not whole-VM images.

To recover a host: Terraform re-provisions the VM → Ansible redeploys → restic
restores the data. **No Proxmox Backup Server.** This keeps 3-2-1 cheap, fits
pCloud's 1 TB comfortably, and turns every restore into a continuous proof that the
IaC *and* the backups both work.

Trade-off accepted: recovery is slower than a VM-image restore (a full Ansible run +
data restore, potentially hours), and it bets the repo is complete enough to rebuild
from nothing — which Tier-2 restore testing (Decision 8) exists to verify. **PBS
(Model B) or a per-host hybrid (Model C) can be added later** if real-world RTO proves
too slow; nothing here precludes it.

### 2. One backup tier, ~24 h RPO

A single tier: nightly backup of all state, accepting up to ~24 h of data loss across
the board. No per-data-type tiering yet — revisit once there is real-world data and
experience to justify the added machinery.

### 3. Engine — restic (data) + rclone (off-site); no PBS

- **restic** captures state into an encrypted, deduplicated repository.
- **rclone** replicates the repo to pCloud (pCloud has no good headless Linux client;
  rclone has a first-class pCloud backend).
- restic encrypts the repo at rest, so rclone copies **ciphertext only** — no second
  encryption layer, no pCloud "crypto folder."

### 4. Topology — central pull node (`fisi`), off the cluster

A single backup node owns the canonical restic repo. It is **off the Proxmox
cluster** — an independent failure domain, so copy 2 survives a PVE node (or the whole
cluster) dying. This mirrors the existing pattern for `ubongo` (control) and `askari`
(off-site): a manually-provisioned physical node in its own inventory group, still
Ansible-managed (base hardening + a `backup` role).

**Pull model.** The backup node holds SSH keys to each host; per service it runs the
declared dump command remotely, pulls the declared paths read-only, then `restic`
snapshots the staged data into its *local* repo. **Hosts hold no backup credentials
and cannot reach the repo** — so a compromised or ransomwared service host cannot
delete backup history.

**Backup node assignment:** `fisi` (an HP Elite 600 G9 tower), penciled in / provisional
— the *role* ("the backup node") is load-bearing; the physical assignment may be
revisited when all hardware is on hand. `fisi` holds **2× 8 TB HDDs in a mirror**
(ZFS or mdraid → 8 TB usable, survives one disk failure; not a stripe). It owns the
repo, runs the pull orchestration, runs `rclone → pCloud`, and **docks the USB
air-gap drives** (Decision 11). Pending one hardware item: the SATA power cable from
the board/PSU to the drives. A data-only restic node is a featherweight workload, so
the G9 is comfortably over-specced.

### 5. 3-2-1 mapping

| Copy | Location | Medium | Off-site | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Live data on each host | NVMe/SSD | no | The working data |
| 2 | `fisi` restic repo | 8 TB HDD mirror | no (on-site, off-cluster) | Canonical repo |
| 3 | pCloud (via rclone) | Cloud | **yes** | Encrypted ciphertext; **sync-coupled** (see Decision 9 / threat model) |
| +4 | USB air-gap drive(s) | Removable HDD, **offline** | yes (stored off-site) | The **immutable backstop**; rotated |

≥3 copies, ≥2 media, ≥1 off-site — satisfied, with the air-gap drive as a fourth,
offline copy that no online compromise can reach.

### 6. Per-service backup contract — `backup__*` data + `BACKUP.md` (hard convention)

Almost every boma service is the same shape: a Docker bind-mount data dir + maybe a
database. Each **service role declares its backup needs** in role vars — the same
render-from-data pattern boma uses for `access__*`/`ACCESS.md` (ADR-021):

```yaml
backup__paths:          # bind-mount dirs / files holding state
  - /srv/nextcloud/data
backup__dumps:          # logical app-consistent dumps (list; [] = none)
  - cmd: "docker compose exec -T db pg_dump -U {{ ... }} nextcloud"
    dest: nextcloud-db.sql
```

The pull orchestrator reads these (rendered from inventory) and, per service: SSH in →
run the dumps → pull the dump files + declared paths read-only → `restic` snapshot. A
service with **no** `backup__paths` is explicitly "nothing to back up" (declared, not
silent).

**`BACKUP.md` becomes a required per-service doc** alongside `SECURITY.md` /
`VERIFY.md` / `ACCESS.md`, **rendered from the role's `backup__*` data**, documenting:
what state exists, what is backed up, the dump command, and the per-service **restore**
procedure. A template lives at `docs/backup/service-backup-template.md`. `make lint`
gates its presence for service roles.

### 7. Consistency — logical dumps first, quiesce as an escape hatch

- **Default (A):** databases are captured with logical dumps (`pg_dump` /
  `mysqldump`) — portable, version-independent, restorable to a fresh DB. Plain data
  dirs are backed up as files. No downtime. Cost: every stateful service must declare
  a working dump command, *tested by restore drills*.
- **Escape hatch (B):** a service whose data cannot be dumped live declares a
  quiesce step (stop container → back up volume → restart) in the same contract.
- ZFS/filesystem snapshots are **not** used as the sole DB method (only
  crash-consistent for a live database).

This is agnostic to the open central-vs-per-app database question (TODO 3.9): either
way, each service declares how to dump its own data.

### 8. Restore testing — two tiers

- **Tier 1 — frequent, automated, rolling restore-verify (weekly).** Pick the next
  service in rotation, restore its latest snapshot into a throwaway **container on
  `ubongo`** (reusing boma's existing Molecule harness, ADR-015), start the app
  against the restored data, and **run that service's `VERIFY.md` checks**
  (ADR-008/017) against it, then tear down. This catches the failure that actually
  kills people — *silently corrupt or unrestorable backups*. Failures alert via ntfy.
- **Tier 2 — rare, full DR rehearsal (semi-annual), driven from `ubongo` onto PVE
  staging.** Rebuild a host from zero via Terraform + Ansible + restic restore on the
  staging cluster (only a real PVE node can host the VM; `ubongo` orchestrates). This
  validates the whole Model-A recovery chain, not just "can I read a snapshot."
  **At least once a year the rehearsal exercises the paper-secret break-glass path**
  (Decision 10) end-to-end.

`ubongo` stays **bare Debian, not a hypervisor** (ADR-015 unchanged): its job is to be
the independent recovery anchor — "the tool used to rebuild the cluster must not live
inside the thing it rebuilds." Higher-fidelity real-VM testing is *better* served by
the PVE staging env (same hardware class, same cluster, same provisioning path) than
by converting `ubongo`. `ubongo`'s real spec is a ThinkCentre M70q (i3-10100T / 16 GB
/ **1 TB NVMe**) — the 1 TB gives ample room for Tier-1 dataset restores; disk
headroom (not CPU/RAM) is the first thing to watch as data grows (`/capacity-review`).

### 9. Retention — GFS via restic

Starting policy: `--keep-daily 7 --keep-weekly 4 --keep-monthly 6 --keep-yearly 1`.
`restic forget --prune` runs nightly on `fisi`'s repo; pCloud mirrors the pruned repo.
Tune once real repo growth is observed.

### 10. Encryption + key escrow + break-glass

restic already encrypts the repo, so **one secret — the restic repo password —
protects all copies uniformly** (fisi, pCloud, USB). One thing to escrow, not three.

**Escrow locations:**
- **`fisi`, root-only** (+ in the Ansible vault) — so backups run non-interactively
  and `fisi` is redeployable.
- **Vaultwarden** — the day-to-day human-accessible copy.
- **Paper, in a physical safe (off-site)** — the break-glass root of trust; the only
  copy that survives "everything is down."

**Model-A twist — the paper holds *two* secrets, not one:**
1. the **restic repo password** (to read any backup at all), and
2. the **Ansible vault master password** (to rebuild hosts from the repo — normally
   from Vaultwarden via `rbw`, which is itself down in a from-zero recovery).

With both on paper, the break-glass chain has **no circular dependency**: paper →
restic restores Vaultwarden + repo data → the vault password (from paper) drives
Terraform/Ansible re-provisioning → services return, `rbw` works again. `ubongo`'s
ADR-015 recovery model already establishes **`mamba` (laptop) as a break-glass clone**
(repo + toolchain + mesh + `rbw`, with Terraform state synced to it) — the rebuild can
be driven from `mamba` if `ubongo` is also gone. The printed sheet is a short
**break-glass runbook** assuming zero running boma infrastructure: install restic on
any machine, point it at pCloud *or* a USB drive with the password, restore Vaultwarden
first, then rebuild with the vault password.

### 11. USB air-gap trigger (plug-and-go cold copy)

A **udev rule on `fisi` matching an allowlist of known drive serials** triggers a
systemd unit → script that: mounts the drive, confirms it is an expected drive, runs
**`restic copy` from the local repo → a restic repo on the USB drive** (dedup-aware,
same password → ciphertext if lost/stolen), runs `restic check` on the USB copy,
unmounts, and **notifies via ntfy** with the result. Only allowlisted serials trigger
anything (a rogue USB does nothing).

`restic copy` (not rsync) so the USB is itself a valid restic repo — restorable
**directly** in a break-glass with nothing else alive. Rotate among a few drives,
**stored off-site** → also a second *geographic* off-site copy independent of pCloud.

### 12. Failure alerting — guard against silent death

Success/failure pings alone miss the worst case (*the job silently stopped running*):
- **Dead-man's-switch:** every successful nightly run pings an **Uptime Kuma push
  monitor** (already in the planned stack); no ping in ~25 h → alert.
- **Immediate failure → ntfy** on any job or `predump` error.
- **Periodic `restic check`** (weekly) for repo integrity → alert on corruption.
- **Tier-1 restore-verify failures → ntfy.**
- *(Later)* emit last-success timestamp + repo size as Prometheus metrics for a
  Grafana panel (fits ADR-018's monitoring direction; not required for v1).

### 13. Schedule

- **Nightly backup run (~02:00–04:00),** driven by `fisi` (pull): per host →
  `predump` → pull paths read-only → `restic` snapshot → `restic forget --prune`
  (Decision 9) → `rclone sync` → pCloud. Sequential, off-hours.
- **Tier-1 restore-verify:** weekly, rolling one service, on `ubongo`.
- **Tier-2 DR rehearsal:** semi-annual on staging; ≥1/year exercises the paper path.
- **USB air-gap:** manual, ~monthly, whenever a drive is docked.

## Architecture & data flow (nightly run)

```
                         ┌─────────────────────────────────────────┐
  docker_hosts / etc.    │                fisi (backup node)        │
  ┌───────────┐  SSH     │  pull orchestrator (reads backup__* )    │
  │ service A │◀─────────│   1. ssh host → run predump (pg_dump…)   │
  │  + DB     │  pull RO │   2. pull dump + backup__paths (read-only)│
  └───────────┘─────────▶│   3. restic snapshot → local repo (mirror)│
  ┌───────────┐          │   4. restic forget --prune (GFS)         │
  │ service B │          │   5. rclone sync repo → pCloud (offsite) │
  └───────────┘          │   6. heartbeat → Uptime Kuma; errors→ntfy│
                         └───────────────┬──────────────────────────┘
                                         │ (manual, ~monthly)
                                udev: known drive plugged
                                         ▼
                              restic copy → USB repo (air-gap, offline)
```

Restore (Model A): Terraform re-provisions the VM → Ansible redeploys the role →
restic restores `backup__paths` + replays the dump → `VERIFY.md` confirms.

## Components & boundaries

- **`backup` role (on `fisi`):** pull orchestrator, restic repo management, retention
  prune, rclone→pCloud sync, udev/air-gap unit, alerting hooks. New inventory group
  (e.g. `backup_hosts`) with the `base` role applied, like `control`/`offsite_hosts`.
- **Per-service backup contract:** `backup__*` role vars + rendered `BACKUP.md`
  (Decision 6); a hard convention enforced by `make lint`.
- **`ubongo`:** schedules/drives Tier-1 (local container) and Tier-2 (onto staging);
  unchanged role per ADR-015.
- **Secrets:** restic password + rclone token in `fisi` (root-only) and the Ansible
  vault; escrowed per Decision 10.

## Threat model / 3-2-1 honesty

- **`rclone sync` propagates deletions** — a prune, or a *malicious* wipe of `fisi`'s
  repo, replicates to pCloud. pCloud is therefore the **off-site** copy but **not
  immutable**. Mitigations: the **USB air-gap drive is the immutable backstop**
  (offline = unreachable by any online compromise) and **pCloud's own file-version
  history** is enabled as a recovery cushion.
- **Pull model** stops a compromised *service host* from touching the repo.
- **`fisi` is the crown-jewel host** — it holds an encrypted copy of all state, so it
  gets full base hardening and tight access. restic encryption means a stolen `fisi`
  (or USB, or pCloud blob) yields ciphertext only.
- **pCloud's 1 TB is the smallest copy → the off-site capacity ceiling.** Data-only
  backups fit for years at homelab scale; flag for `/capacity-review` if the repo
  trends toward ~1 TB.

## What this changes in the repo (for the plan)

- New `backup` role + `backup_hosts` inventory group; `fisi` hardware-reference entry.
- New per-service convention: `backup__*` vars + `BACKUP.md` (template at
  `docs/backup/service-backup-template.md`); `make lint` gate; update role-conventions
  in `CLAUDE.md` and the new-role scaffolding/runbook.
- Update `docs/hardware/reference.md`: `ubongo` = M70q (i3-10100T/16 GB/**1 TB**);
  add `fisi`.
- Update `CAPABILITIES.md` §9 (PBS → deferred; restic+rclone+USB the committed engine).
- Close `docs/TODO.md` 3.8; cross-reference from ADR-011.
- The break-glass runbook (printed sheet + `docs/runbooks/`), referencing ADR-015's
  `mamba` clone and Terraform-state survival.

## Non-goals / YAGNI

- No PBS / whole-VM images in v1 (Decision 1).
- No per-data-type RPO tiering in v1 (Decision 2).
- No second encryption layer over restic (Decision 3).
- No central NAS/file-share scope creep on `fisi` — it stays single-purpose.

## Open / deferred

- Central vs per-app database (TODO 3.9) — orthogonal; this design works either way.
- Prometheus backup metrics — later add (Decision 12).
- PBS (Model B) or hybrid (Model C) — revisit if real-world RTO is too slow.